Politics, Foreign Reserves and the Exchange-Rate-Based-Stabilization-Policy: The Lebanese Case by Dakhlallah, Kassim M.
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Topics in Middle Eastern and North African
Economies Quinlan School of Business
9-1-2010
Politics, Foreign Reserves and the Exchange-Rate-
Based-Stabilization-Policy: The Lebanese Case
Kassim M. Dakhlallah
American University in Dubai
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Quinlan School of Business at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact
ecommons@luc.edu.
© 2010 the authors
Recommended Citation
Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies, electronic journal, Volume 12, Middle East Economic Association and
Loyola University Chicago, September, 2010, http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/
  
 
 
1 
 
      Politics, Foreign Reserves and the Exchange-
Rate-Based-Stabilization-Policy 
The Lebanese Case 
Kassim M. Dakhlallah1 
American University in Dubai  
________________________________________________________________________  
 
Abstract 
Lebanon, as well as many underdeveloped countries, uses its foreign reserves 
as a tool to support its exchange rate based stabilization policy.  Looking at the 
causes behind fluctuations of foreign reserves is of extreme importance, 
especially after it has been proved that foreign reserves are causes of stability 
and disturbances to stabilization policies around the globe.  Of particular 
interest is the political variable; it emerged in the literature that politics play a 
strong role in determining the stability of the foreign reserves, but that did not 
happen in Lebanon.  Politics in Lebanon did not have an impact on the level of 
foreign reserves, and it did not disturb the stabilization policy. My results, 
however, confirm that the stabilization policy  is a viable policy, and especially 
after I showed that Lebanon’s key macroeconomic variables behave as 
predicted by the stylized facts of exchange rate based stabilization policy.   
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Introduction and theoretical background 
a. Introduction 
Foreign reserve holdings by central banks have been used as a tool to defend 
the exchange-rate-based-stabilization-policies around the globe.  The depletion 
of these holdings is a major cause of concern.  It is a dimension over which 
there is little control; it relates among other things, to regional and domestic 
politics.  Focusing on this dimension is quite important, especially when we 
consider that a small open economy like Lebanon with its history of political 
instability is subject to reserve depletion due to its vulnerability to domestic 
and regional politics. This vulnerability shakes confidence in the local 
economy and raises the question as to whether the Lebanese financial authority 
fulfils its commitment by protecting its stabilization policy in the event 
political problems occur. Nonetheless, the policy of defending the stabilization 
policy by direct intervention in the foreign exchange market proved to be very 
successful, and that is despite the difficulties that the stabilization program has 
encountered.  Some of these difficulties are political instability, large budget 
and current account deficits and huge debt.  The large budget deficits, for 
instance, created pressure for the government to monetize its debt and it put 
upward pressure on inflation and downward pressure on the peg, thus losing 
foreign reserves and putting the stabilization policy at risk.   
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b. Theoretical Background 
A significant amount of literature exists concerning the survival of the 
ERBSP2.  The literature focused on the experience of countries plagued by 
high and chronic inflation (rates above 30-40 percent a year) and by severe 
macroeconomic instability.  These experiences have several common elements: 
after the stabilization policy is implemented, inflation usually falls, but 
convergence to the inflation rate of the pegged currency is slow and 
incomplete. Domestic demand rises quickly, output expands, national saving 
declines, the current account deficit widens, and   nominal interest rate falls.   
i. Why governments adopt the ERBSP 
 It is important to explore the reasons that motivate governments to adopt the 
ERBSP and that is despite the heavy burdens that governments could carry.  
First, in the short run, a fixed exchange rate provides a nominal anchor for the 
currency, thereby reducing inflationary expectations.  In a longer-term view, it 
makes access to international capital markets easier by providing more stability 
and predictability in foreign exchange markets.  Trade relations constitute a 
second reason for fixing the exchange rate.  Small, open economies like 
Lebanon that trade heavily with one or a few bigger partners do not have much 
scope for an independent monetary policy, and a stable exchange rate carries 
the advantage of reducing transactions cost.  Third, a fixed exchange rate may 
induce greater financial discipline on the part of the authorities since it places 
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their foreign reserve holdings at risk.  Fourth, a nominal exchange rate anchor 
is readily observed by all participants in the economy and may be more 
effective in reducing high inflation in the face of unstable money demand, 
large movements in velocity, and a high degree of dollarization.  Yet, even 
well-engineered exchange-rate-based-stabilization programs that succeed in 
bringing down inflation for a sustained period may set in motion a dynamic 
process that can lead to a financial crisis and the program’s collapse.   
II. Literature review 
Several theories were set forth to explore the relationship between the holding 
of foreign reserves and the ERBSP.  Among them is: 
i. The first generation currency crisis model represented by (Krugman 
1979), where economic agents perceive the decline of the stock of 
foreign reserves, and to avoid losses, they launch a speculative attack 
on the currency before it depletes, thus the collapse of the ERBSP.  
ii. The sticky inflation theory by (Dornbusch and Rodriguez 1982) states 
that fixing the exchange rate reduces the nominal and real interest rate, 
which leads to an appreciation of real exchange rate and a deterioration 
of trade balance. Two opposing effects emerge: the expansionary effect 
and the contractionary effect.  The expansionary effect of the fall in the 
interest rate dominates the contractionary effect of the loss of 
competitiveness, causing aggregate demand to increase.  The increase 
in demand, combined with the inertia in inflation rates and the currency 
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peg, causes an overvaluation of the domestic currency.  Overvaluation, 
in turn, causes output to decline and, eventually, leads to a speculative 
attack on the currency; thus, the loss of foreign reserves and the 
deterioration of the ERBSP.   
iii. The wealth effect theory by (Helpman and Razin 1987) is generated by 
intergenerational redistribution of wealth, where the dynamics of 
disinflation program, anchored by fixing the nominal exchange rate, are 
driven by wealth effects.  It results in a temporarily higher consumption 
level, worsening trade accounts, large government debt, and reserve 
losses.    
iv. In the second generation currency crisis model by (Obstfeld 1994), 
there is a tension between the government’s desire to abandon its 
ERBSP and its desire to defend it   by using its foreign reserves.   It 
follows that the cost of defending the policy increases when people 
suspect that the government is leaning towards abandoning the 
stabilization policy.   
 
Additional and relevant theories that explore the link between foreign reserves 
and the ERBSP are presented by   (Calvo and Mendoza 1996a, b) and 
(Krugman 1979).  The theory states that because deposits are guaranteed by the 
monetary authority, depositors do not question the behavior of bankers which 
in turn induces bankers to pursue risky activities. As a result, the prospect of 
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devaluation increases.  Devaluation in turn leads to a shift from domestic 
currency towards foreign currency.  Banks will not be able to honor the 
depositors and will be rescued by the central bank as the lender-of-last-resort, 
thus the economy loses foreign reserves.   Krugman (1979) agreed with Calvo 
and Mendoza (1996) but added that bankers are speculators who have nothing 
to lose but a lot to gain from riskier portfolios, and that large current account 
deficits with a slow inflow of capital leads to the expectation that foreign 
reserves may reach exhaustion.    
c. Definitions of success and failures 
The definitions of success and failures of the ERBSP are of great importance, 
and in order to define success or failure I follow the following criteria.      
i. Two or more years below 40 percent annual inflation following two or 
more years above 40 percent constitutes a successful stabilization 
episode (Bruno and Easterly 1995).     
ii. An “inflation crisis” as a period of at least two consecutive years of 
inflation above 40 percent and   “non-crisis” as a period of at least two 
consecutive years with inflation below 40 percent (Easterly 1996). 
iii.  (Hamann and Prati 2001) collected seven years of data:  the 
stabilization year, three years before, and three years after.  They 
implied that disinflation that lasts at least three years should be 
classified as successful, but there is no presumption that they will not 
fail later on.   
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iv. (Willett 1999) defines a successful stabilization program as one which 
results in the reduction of annual inflation rates to the low double-to 
single-digit range (below 25 percent per annum), without price and 
wage controls, and maintains low rates for at least three years.  Willett 
does not believe that these criteria are too strong and, not wanting his 
conclusions to rest on the use of a single controversial definition, he 
considers a second looser indication of success that requires only that 
there be a substantial reduction in inflation from the previous years that 
is not due to wage and price controls.  
 
In Part II of this paper, I test for the effectiveness of the ERBSP on inflation 
and on the behavior of key macroeconomic variables.  In Part III,   I explore 
the variables that affect the holdings of foreign reserves.  I proceed by 
implementing modern time series analysis where several variables are tested 
on the dependent variable-‘Foreign Reserves’.  In Part IV, I conclude with 
policy recommendations.   
    
     Part II.  Testing for the effectiveness of the ERBSP.    
To test as to whether Lebanon’s stabilization policy produced the desired 
outcome, I compare the behavior of some of its key macroeconomic variables to 
those of four countries of Latin America that adopted the exchange rate as a 
stabilization tool.  The importance of the countries I chose stems from fact that 
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after repeated failures their stabilization policies succeeded. By successful, I mean 
key macroeconomics variables behaved as predicted by the stylized facts of 
ERBSP3 and that the success rate is based on the standard criteria used by the 
above mentioned scholars. To illustrate success or failure, I denote the year in 
which the stabilization program was initiated as year T and the years that follow-
year T+1, T+2 and T+3 and so on.  I also identify the year before the stabilization 
year as year   T-1.  Figure 1 illustrates that in year T, the stabilization year,  the  
inflation rate started to decline in all of the countries under study4 and it continued 
to decline in the subsequent years till  T+6,  an indication that the stabilization 
policy was successful in controlling for inflation.   This conclusion enables me to 
proceed further by testing for the stylized facts of ERBSP.     
a. Stylized Facts of Exchange Rate Based Stabilization Policies.  
Reinhart and Vegh (1995), Khamis (1996), and Hamann (1999),  have 
documented key stylized facts for ERBSP based on observing the behavior of 
key macroeconomic variables that  characterized the ERBSP in high inflation 
countries during the past thirty years.  Their observations include: 
i. Current account as a percent of GDP:  The behavior of the current 
account as a percent of GDP is considered as one of the key stylized 
facts of ERBSP.    The current account deteriorates with the current 
                                                 
3   Most of those countries used the foreign reserve as a tool to defend the stabilization policy.   They 
     include  Lebanon, Argentina,    Brazil, Peru and Mexico whose stabilization  program started at 
     year T.   T for Argentina   corresponds to   1991.2, for Brazil  1994.3,  for  
     Mexico 1988.1, for Lebanon 1992.12,  for Peru  1990.4 
4   Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Peru provide important and highly contrasting experiences with 
     ERBS  programs.  Each of their economies suffered financial crisis because of reserves depletion. 
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account deficits being financed by large capital inflows.5  
            
            
In a (small) 
open economy like Lebanon subject to exogenous shocks, central banks 
sometimes try to use monetary (or credit) policy in an attempt to 
counter the effects of terms of trade disturbances.  Under these 
circumstances, domestic credit would be expanded when the terms of 
trade worsen, and contracted when the terms of trade improve.  The 
current account, as a percent of GDP for Lebanon, Brazil, Argentina, 
Peru, and Mexico, exhibits the predictable J curve, an initial decrease, 
and then an increase as illustrated by Figure 2. 
ii.  Domestic Credit as a percent of GDP:   Under fixed exchange rates, 
the magnitude of credit expansion will be restricted by the availability 
of international reserves and the country’s capacity to borrow 
internationally.  The share of private credit (lending to the private 
sector in domestic currency) as a percent of GDP resumed the upward 
trend for Lebanon, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Peru since the 
initiation of their stabilization policies.  This is predicted by one of the 
stylized facts of ERBSP, a steady increase, and then a decline, as 
shown in Figure 3.  
iii. Fiscal Discipline:  The success of the stabilization policy did not seem 
to discipline governments’ fiscal spending.  However, these 
                                                 
5 Reliable data on capital flow for Lebanon are not available because capital flow in 
   and   out  throughout private individuals.  Nevertheless, some inference about the size 
   of such   flows may be drawn from changes in foreign reserves of the BDL.   
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governments realized that unless fiscal behavior is controlled, the 
stabilization policy would eventually collapse.  Figure 46 illustrates 
clearly the shift in government policies from worsening to improving 
their fiscal discipline.    The sustainability of a fiscal policy program 
depends on, among other factors, the overall macroeconomic policy 
mix and the current level and structure of the debt-to-GDP ratio.  In 
Lebanon, and due to war recovery effort, a sharp increase in 
government expenditure was the predominant characteristic of public 
finances during the period 1993-97.  Government expenditure rose 
from 23 percent of GDP in 1993 to 42 percent in 1997.  This 
expenditure category consists primarily of salaries and wages, 
purchases of goods and services, and transfers and subsidies.  Mexico’s 
fiscal discipline, as illustrated by Figure 5, did not behave as predicted.  
Mexico’s fiscal discipline improved at the time the stabilization policy 
was initiated, but worsened at a later stage which led to the Mexican 
financial crisis and the collapse of the ERBSP.  
iv.  Gross National Expenditures:  The initiation of a stabilization policy 
triggers an expansion in economic activities that is primarily caused by 
a private consumption boom and an increase in real wages.  Although 
the post-stabilization path of the economic activity level reproduces the 
                                                 
6 I used the actual budget deficit as a percent of GDP.   I did not use the standardized budget deficit 
   because it lacks  data on tax revenue and because many of the countries under studies do not 
   depend on tax as a major source of revenue. 
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usual economic boom that follows stabilization programs based on 
exchange-rate anchors, such a boom did not appear in Lebanon, as 
shown in Figure 6, and that could be attributed to the fact that most of 
the economic activities at the early stages of the stabilization program 
were due to war recovery effort.   
In light of the above findings, it is legitimate to conclude that the stabilization 
program in Lebanon induced key macroeconomic variables to behave as 
predicted by the stylized fact of exchange rate stabilization policy, and thus it 
produced the desired outcome.  This conclusion enables me to proceed with the 
empirical analysis. 
                                                                            
Part III.  Empirical analysis 
I begin the empirical analysis by explaining the explanatory variables, and then 
I proceed to  results  interpretations.     
a. Explanatory Variables:   
i. Foreign Reserve:  The international reserves net of gold holdings.  
The inclusion of gold will not change the results of the paper for two 
reasons.  First, central banks in general do not vary their holdings of 
gold reserves.  Second, gold holdings by central banks lost its 
importance since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in the 
early 1970s. 
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ii. Dollarization:    Defined as the ratio of foreign currency deposits to 
total deposits.  In a country such as Lebanon, which has been marked 
by political instability, currency substitution/dollarization must be 
investigated carefully. When there is extensive currency substitution it 
is likely that monetary shocks will be relatively larger in magnitude, 
as unexpected shifts between domestic and foreign capital may occur.   
A negative sign is expected 
iii. Domestic Credit:    An increase in private sector credit growth, being 
interpreted as an increase in GDP growth, would, ceteris paribus, 
reduces the fiscal deficit as a percent of GDP and reduces the supply 
of domestic assets and increases the demand for domestic assets, 
thereby increasing the foreign reserves. A positive sign is expected 
iv. Interest rate differential:  The cost of holding reserves which is the 
difference between Lebanese three months treasury bills and 
comparable US three months treasury bills. The differential has been 
Large and positive since the 1980’s.  From this perspective, the 
persistent positive interest rate differential in Lebanon reflects its 
status as a postwar economy.   However, given the unsterilized 
intervention a positive sign is expected 
v. Dummy Variable:     The 0-1 dummy variable (D) takes the value of 1 
during periods of heightened political uncertainty, such as anit-
government demonstrations, number of assassinations, major cabinet 
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changes, and major government crisis, war on national territory, civil 
war, and sectarian tension. A negative sign is expected 
vi. External debt:  Many studies discovered that external debt is among 
the main factors contributing to foreign reserves depletion.  Thus a 
positive sign is expected. 
vii. Confidence variable:  Presented by the ratio of short term debt to 
foreign reserves.   High ratio of short-term debt to reserve makes it 
hard for the country to pay off all short-term creditors in the event of a 
panic.  Thus, the country is more vulnerable to a confidence crisis.  A 
negative sign is  expected 
b. Data: 
The data is monthly, ranging from 1993 till end of 2005.  It is taken from the 
Lebanese Central Bank, the International Financial Statistics, and the World 
Development Indicators.   I estimate the above variables using Ordinary Least 
Squares for the period of   January 1993 to December 2005.   I chose this set of 
dates because it is the time period starting from the initiation of the 
stabilization policy till the assassination of late Prime Minister Hariri. 
 
 
c. Regression analysis:   
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I start this section by regressing the dependent variable “Foreign Reserve” on 
the independent variables as shown in the below equation, but before I proceed  
I must look  for stationary and correct for it.  
   
                   )/(6)(5                 
)(4()(2 )t/TDtLN(FCD1 )3
εββ
ββββα
ttFRtSTDtED
tDLNiLNtDCLNLNFR
us
ti
leb
t
+++
++++= −
                                                                                                                                  
• LN (FR):              Natural Log of international reserve net of gold holdings 
• LN tt TDFCD /( ):  Natural Log of  dollarization 
• LN( tDC ):             Natural Log of  domestic credit to private sector 
• LN( USt
Leb
t ii − ):     Natural Log of interest rate differential between 
                                          Lebanese three month treasury bill minus US three 
                                          Months Treasury bills 
• LN( tt TRSRD / ):   Natural Log of confidence interval measured as the 
                                           ratio of short term debt to total reserve. 
• ( tD ):                     Dummy variable 
• LN( tED ):             Natural Log of external debt  
  
i. Testing for stationary:  Theory suggests that shocks to a stationary time 
series are temporary; the effect of the shocks will dissipate and the 
series will revert to its long-run mean.  Non-stationary variables, on the 
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other hand, may have a pronounced trend or meander without a 
constant long-run mean or variance.  In addition, a stationary error term 
means that the variables have tended to move together over the long 
run; and that if an exogenous shock drives the variables out of 
equilibrium,    there is a tendency for them to move together again.  In 
order to test for the presence of a unit root, I use the Dickey-Fuller and 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.  The Philip-Perron test, which 
entails less stringent restriction on the error process, is used as well.   It 
is important, however, to mention that structural change complicates 
the tests for trends; a structural break makes an otherwise stationary 
series appear to be non-stationary.   For instance, the series ‘Foreign 
Reserve’ exhibits a structural break and with that, Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron test statistics are biased toward the non rejection of a 
unit root.   By applying the above tests, Table 1 and table 2, I conclude 
that all of the variables except the “Dummy variable’ has a unit root, 
thus a correction is required. 
ii.   Correcting for stationary:  The correction for stationarity entails 
different treatment for different variables. Series such as 
‘Dollarization’, ‘Interest Rate Differential’, and ‘Confidence’, can be 
transformed into a stationary model by differencing.  On the other 
hand, series that exhibits sustained upward trend such as ‘External 
Debt’ and ‘Domestic Credit’ can be transformed into a stationary 
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model by removing the deterministic trend; consequently, a serious 
problem is encountered when the inappropriate method is used.   Thus, 
the de-trending procedure entails estimating the series ‘External 
Debt’, tED , on a constant and time and estimating the series ‘Domestic 
Credit’, tDC , on a constant and time as shown by Equation a and 
Equation b.                                          
           te  time)52.51( 02.0)59.141( .39.6)( ++=tEDLN     Eq.  a 
          te   time(37.425)0.0131(327.033)9.438 )( ++=tDCLN    Eq. b    
The t-statistic (shown in parentheses) in Eq. a and Eq. b indicates that the 
coefficients are highly significant, and by observing the ACF and PACF of the 
de-trended data in ‘External Debt’ series, the ACF does die out after 16 
months.  In such a case, de-trending the data does result in a stationary series 
and the residuals, (e t ), become the de-trended values of the ‘External Debt’.  
On the other hand, the ACF for the series ‘Domestic Credit’ does not die out 
after 16 months which means that de-trending the data does not result in a 
stationary series.   The remedy is to regress the variable ‘Domestic Credit’ on 
time, time squared and time cubed as shown in   Eq. c.   The t-statistic (shown 
in parentheses) in Eq. c are significant; thus (e t ) become the de-trended values 
of the series  ‘Domestic Credit’.     
)225.2(
32
)85.10()75.38()62.693(
07.03178176.100014.003.004.9)( tettDCLog t −+−+= −    Eq. c 
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iii. The first round of Analysis:  Having corrected for stationarity, I begin 
with the first round of analysis  and I derive the following results 
1  Eq.                                   
37.6
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  6.02 =R       DW= 1.56    F=33.96    
 6.02 =R   Suggest that the regression equation is a good fit, and the F test at 
33.39 is highly significant which means that the model is good in predicting 
the level of foreign reserves.   However, the DW of 1.56 implies serial 
correlation which requires additional testing.  Additional testing for the 
presence of serial correlation is conducted by using the Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
correlation LM.   Unlike the Durbin-Watson statistic for AR(1) errors, the 
(Breusch-Godfrey, 1978) Serial correlation LM test is applicable whether or 
not there are lagged dependent variables.  In addition, the F statistic shown in 
Table 3 is an omitted variable test for the joint significance of all lagged 
squared residuals.  The observations times R-squared statistic is the Engle’s 
LM test statistic, computed as the number of observations times the 2R  from 
the test regression.  Therefore, the test does not reject the hypothesis of no 
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serial correlation up to order four, indicating that the error terms are serially 
correlated.  In addition, the analysis of table 4 indicates that the Auto 
Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and the White Heteroskedasticity 
tests for Eq. 1 reject the null hypothesis of no Heteroskedasticiy.  
    
The assumption of normality is tested for by using (Jarque – Bera 1987).  It is a 
statistic for testing whether the series is normally distributed.    The kurtosis of 
Eq. 1 is 10.69 which entails that the distribution is peaked relative to the 
normal.    Under the null hypothesis of a normal distribution, the Jarque-Bera 
statistic is distributed as X 2  with 2 degrees of freedom.  The reported 
probability is the probability that the Jarque-Bera statistic is 423.2, which 
exceeds (in absolute value) the observed value under the null hypothesis.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0% level of significance 
indicating that the error term is normally distributed with mean almost equal to 
zero; thus satisfying the assumptions that the error term must be normally 
distributed with  zero mean.    
iv. The Second Round of Analysis:  The interpretation of equation 1 illustrates 
that the results exhibit low R-squared and that the presence of serial correlation 
persists.   I correct for serial correlation    by adding AR(1) on the right hand 
side of   Eq. 2     
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6.02 =R 5,   DW=1.78, and F=34.4  
The three indicators improved relative to Eq. 1.     In addition, skewness 
improved to 0.635, the Jaque-Bera improved to 19.3, and the Kurtosis 
improved to 4.3.  However, dummy’s coefficient that was expected to show 
strong improvement after the correction   did not perform.  This could be 
attributed to the fact that the impact of the political shock was not felt till 
several months.    
v. Final round of analysis:  Several lags were tried on each of the explanatory 
variables of Eq.2.  The results did not improve till I lagged the ‘Dummy 
Variable’ tD  by three periods.  The derived results are shown in Eq. 3 
( ) ( )
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The three main indicators, 2R =0.67, DW=2.01, F=37.9, improved in 
comparison to Eq. 2.  
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IV. Interpretation of Results 
In interpreting the new results in equation 3, the intercept is positive and 
significant, which means that if all the variables are equal to zero, the inflow of 
capital continues.  Capital flows to Lebanon because of the large number of 
Lebanese expatriates living outside of Lebanon.  Due to reasons that are 
beyond the scope of this paper, most Lebanese expatriates transfer money to 
Lebanon regardless of the political situation, and regardless of government 
policy, national debt, interest rate differential or domestic credit.  On the other 
hand, the political variable represented by the dummy variable shows weak 
and positive relationship vis-à-vis the level of foreign reserves. That is contrary 
to what has been found by previous scholars. (Radelet and Sachs 1998) found 
out that major causes of reserve depletion are political instability.  It is 
important however, to explain the reasons that isolated the holding of foreign 
reserves from the political situation.  First, political tension in Lebanon is a 
double-edged sword which is likely to exacerbate the depletion of the foreign 
reserves such as to alleviate it.  In addition,  the capital that inflows to Lebanon 
can be categorized into two different categories.   The first category is the “Hot 
Capital”;   the accumulation of “Hot Capital” should be a major concern 
because these flows are quickly reversible in the case of a change in the 
political conditions.   The second category is the “Political Capital”; it flows to 
Lebanon in the form of financial aid to the government and to the people by 
foreign governments and world financial institutions. I conclude that when the 
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political situation worsens, “Hot Money” outflows while “Political Money” 
inflows.  The results I derived in Eq. 3 show that the political money is slightly 
stronger than the hot money. I conclude that political tensions in Lebanon 
trigger capital to inflow to the country rather than to outflow.   
 
Additional interpretation into Eq. 3 indicates that the extent of ‘Dollarization’ 
has the strongest impact on the ‘Foreign Reserve’ with a significant coefficient 
of 1.18. In a country such as Lebanon, where the dollar is used as a medium of 
exchange, unit of account and store of value; ‘Dollarization’ must be looked 
and analyzed carefully. When the Lebanese pound started to depreciate since 
the early 80’s till the early 90’s, the ordinary Lebanese  citizen did not 
comprehend fast enough the meaning of a depreciated currency; thus the rate 
of depreciation was much faster than an ordinary Lebanese citizen can 
understand.  However, the situation changed completely during the 90’s and 
early 2000.  When political turmoil or suspicion about the economy occurred, 
people did not hesitate to convert the domestic currency to US dollars; thus the 
impact of dollarization on the level of foreign reserves was felt immediately. 
Furthermore, the growth of ‘Domestic Credit’, (DC t ) to the private sector is 
positive and significant with a coefficient of 0.88 and   t = 3.39. The growth of 
domestic credit is correlated to the growth of the gross domestic product, thus 
economic growth translates into higher level of reserves.      External debts 
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( tED ) series is negative with a coefficient of 0.06 and t-test of 1.71.  Donor 
countries provide easy loans to Lebanon in order to increase its holding of 
foreign reserves.   This build up of reserve has been used as cushion signaling 
the authorities’ commitment to their ERBSP by conducting unsterilized 
intervention.  Interest rate differential between short-term assets denominated 
in Lebanese pounds and comparable US dollar assets have been large and 
positive since the 1990’s. The average interest rate differential between three-
month treasury bills denominated in Lebanese pounds and U.S dollars has 
amounted to about 12 percent.  During the 80’s, the large differentials reflected 
the war-related macroeconomic instability, and the large differential continued 
to be large even after the end of 1992, when the authorities moved decisively 
to overcome the inflationary expectations by adopting the ERBSP, which has 
been maintained since. Last variable is the ‘Confidence’ variable.  It is 
significant and negative.  It indicates that the accumulation of short term debt 
reduces confidence in the economic system. 
   
  IV. Policy Recommendations 
 Despite   the political turmoil that Lebanon experienced, the ERBSP survived 
and the holdings of reserves remained strong.  In light of that, it is legitimate to 
conclude that the ERBSP is a viable policy for Lebanon.  I attribute my 
decision to several reasons:  the stabilization policy supported by the high level 
of foreign reserves succeeded in stabilizing the price level, and it induced key 
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macroeconomic variables to behave as predicted by the stylized facts of 
ERBSP which is a sign of a healthy economy.  In addition, the ERBSP brought 
confidence to the Lebanese currency by reducing the level of dollarization.  
However, dollarization must be an issue of concern to policy makers and it 
cannot be ignored.    One of the quickest remedies for keeping low levels of 
dollarization is to increase the interest rate on the Lebanese Pound, but too 
much of an increase may generate the opposite effect.  Some institutional 
measures to cut on dollarization might be appropriate.   Furthermore, the  
Lebanese government must take additional steps is to  stabilize its fiscal 
account, that the level of external debt resulting from government borrowing 
drops, so the stock of reserves does not reach low levels that can reduce the 
validity of the stabilization policy.   In addition, good macroeconomic policies, 
manageable fiscal deficits and monetary policy directed towards sustaining the 
ERBSP are extremely important, but these policies must be accompanied by 
good political climate and efficient institutions.  Without the proper settings,    
maintaining the ERBSP may become so costly that the government may 
abandon it.   Consistency between macro and fiscal policies are crucial to the 
survival of the ERBSP.  The monetary policy and the fiscal and trade policies 
must be devoted entirely to maintaining the ERBSP.  If these policies do not 
support stabilization policy, costs will eventually outweigh benefits and the 
peg will become prohibitively expensive to maintain.  In this case, it would be 
better to abandon the policy when the costs of doing so are still low.     The 
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costs of maintaining and abandoning the ERBSP is also important with regard 
to credibility issues.  A government that tries to create credibility by pegging 
the currency can reap short-term benefits by lowering inflationary expectations 
and eliminating exchange rate volatility.  However, this credibility must be 
earned by prudent macroeconomic management and institutional development.  
Therefore, in principle, there is no way for policymakers to categorically prove 
to the public that the ERBSP will be protected until the economy actually 
arrives at a point when the public expects the policy to change its course.  
Hence, in practice the stabilization program in Lebanon is likely to suffer from 
credibility problems at some point.    
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Domestic Credit to Private Sector as A Percent of GDP
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7 To facilitate the understanding of the graph, I separate Mexico into a different graph 
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Table 1. Philip_Perron Test, Jan. 93-Dec. 05 
Test Statistics                         Variables in LN                                        CV8 
           ( )tFR 






tTD
tFCD  ( )tDC   ( )ustlebt ii −  ( )tD     ( )tED      






tTR
tSTD          
PP             -2.21    -2.01     -6.03        0.15     -11.24   -3.08       -1.69      -2.88 
PP (1)        -9.48    -7.59     -10.88     -8.03    - 84.31   -12.41     -8.06      -2.88 
 
 
Table 2. Dickey Fuller Test, Jan. 93-Dec. 05 
Test Statistics                         Variables in LN                                       CV 
       ( )tFR   






tTD
tFCD  ( )tDC    ( )ustlebt ii −     ( )tD    ( )tED   






tTR
tSTD          
DF          0.38     -1.46       1.01        0.88       -10.52     2.06    -1.05      -1.94 
ADF      -1.262   -2.04      -6.55      -0.241     -11.72    -2.45    -1.41      -2.88 
ADF (1) - 9.35    -7.59      -3.93       -8.07       -8.89     -12.40  -7.77     -2.88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 At the 5% Level  
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 Table 3. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
                        F statistic    Probability    Obs*R squared Probability 
Equation (1)    0.79             0.45                    1.66                            0.44             
 
Table 4.  Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and the white      
               Test: 
                        F statistic    Probability      Obs*R squared Probability 
ARCH             2.88            0.092                     2.86                       0.091 
White              2.72            0.003                     26.6                       0.005      
